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THE PERFORMANCE OF SPUN-OFF SUBSIDIARIES: EFFECTS OF
PROACTIVENESS, LEGITIMACY, AND HUBRIS
ABSTRACT
After being separated from its parent (divesting firm), the child firm (spun-off subsidiary)
becomes a stand-alone, independent publicly traded entity. This corporate restructuring activity
can be considered such a unique transaction due to the fact that the child firm needs to perform
independently without relying on resources provided by the parent firm. Having a proactive
posture is expected to help the child firm better establish its legitimacy in the sector and in turn
better perform overall. In addition, having a hubristic CEO can negatively affect this process at
the beginning (before establishing the legitimacy); however this effect may become positive at
later stages (after establishing the legitimacy). Therefore, this paper examines factors influencing
the performance of the child firm grounded in resource dependence and institutional theories.
Keywords: Corporate spin-offs, Proactiveness, Organizational legitimacy, CEO hubris.
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INTRODUCTION
The corporate spin-off is a form of restructuring technique that aims to create value for
the shareholders (Makhija, 2004). In this transaction, there are three major players: the parent
firm, which is the divesting firm, the child firm, which is the spun-off subsidiary, and
shareholders of the parent firm (Maxwell and Rao, 2003). After this transaction is completed, the
child firm becomes an independent, stand-alone public entity (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983) with
an ultimate goal of creating a better shareholder value (Wruck and Wruck, 2002).

As stated by Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2008), the decision of a corporate spin-off has
two distinct aspects: “the restructuring of the parent firm and the improvement of overall
operations of both the parent and its subsidiary” (p. 103). From their statement, it can be seen
that the spin-off event is expected to benefit both the parent and its child. Desai and Jain (1999)
explain this process of spinning off a subsidiary as follows: “a pro-rata distribution of the shares
of the subsidiary to the parent's shareholders in order to create a new entity that trades
independently of its former parent” (p. 78). Additionally, from the perspective of investors, this
corporate restructuring technique is also very critical due to the fact that it enables “investors to
better understand and assess the restructuring ﬁrm’s value-creating potential” (Bergh, Johnson,
and Dewitt, 2008: 137).

It is expected that creating value for the child firm after becoming an independent entity
may be quite challenging due to several internal and external reasons. In order to handle these
challenges both effectively and efficiently, it is important to study both the behavior of the child
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firm as well as the behavior of top decision makers such as CEOs by also considering industry
requirements. In this paper, I look at the impact of proactiveness on the performance of child
firm mediated by organizational legitimacy and moderated by CEO hubris. Particularly, I argue
that the proactiveness as a firm behavior will help the child better establish its legitimacy and
therefore this child can achieve positive performance outcomes such as creating further
shareholder value. In addition, I argue that until the legitimacy is established, a hubristic CEO
will negatively affect this process; however after this establishment, a hubristic CEO will
actually become beneficial for the child firm. Therefore, this paper conceptually explores critical
success parameters for the child firm as stand-alone, independent entities in the industry
grounded in resource dependence and institutional theories. The conceptual framework of this
paper is shown in Figure 1.
----------------------------------------------Insert figure 1 about here
------------------------------------------------

THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Proactiveness as a firm-level behavior
According to Chen and Hambrick (1995), the proactiveness refers to conditions in which
the firm is able to take initiative towards opportunities that may create successful outcomes. In
the field of strategy, since the main question is to understand why some firms perform better than
others, the proactiveness needs to be considered a critical factor while examining conditions
required for creating healthy firms that can survive for a long time (Chen and Hambrick, 1995).
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In Clerck, Sapienza, and Crijns (2005), they define the proactiveness as follows: “the
firm’s propensity to undertake a continuous search for opportunities, especially opportunities that
do not pertain to the firm’s current activities” (p. 412). Since environmental changes are an
expected part of global world’s conditions, it will be very critical for firms to monitor these
changes and take necessary actions accordingly so that they can survive longer (Lumpkin and
Dess, 1996). For instance, in hostile environments, in order to stay competitive in the industry,
having a proactive posture may be more desirable for the firm (Covin and Slevin, 1989) via
“challenging the status quo rather than passively adapting to present conditions” (Crant, 2000:
436). Therefore, firms need to realize the importance of being proactive in today’s world.

Being proactive basically means searching for new opportunities and information
constantly instead of staying passive and embracing the status quo in the organizational life
(Crant, 2000). From the perspective of entrepreneurial orientation, being proactive explains the
firm’s willingness for taking initiative towards future success and the ability of taking advantage
of opportunities being captured during the environmental scanning (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). In
other words, the proactiveness is “a response to opportunities” (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001: 430)
and considered “a forward-looking perspective” (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001: 431) for the firm.
Thus this concept provides the firm with accessing unique opportunities towards a better future.

For the child firm, after the corporate separation from its parent, it will be very critical to
become an “officially” stand-alone entity via seeking new opportunities and improving its
product or service line accordingly so that it can compete with its rivals effectively
(Venkatraman, 1989). Before the spin-off event, the subsidiary is basically dependent on its
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parent; however, after this corporate separation, it is crucial for the child to survive on its own
and this can be achieved via proactive efforts and strategies. As Lumpkin and Dess (1996) argue,
proactive firms will have a better chance to become industry leaders due to their desire and
willingness for searching and taking advantage of new opportunities. According to the resource
dependence theory, organizations can survive longer dependent on resources obtained from the
external environment (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella, 2007) and they can also better deal
with environmental uncertainties by efficiently using those resources (Hillman et al., 2007).
Therefore, proactive child firms can be in a better position in terms of their survival via
connections with the external environment that provides abundance of resources for growth.

As Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga (2014) define, spin-offs are “extraordinarily
complex transactions, necessitating the separation of formal and informal linkages between the
divesting parent companies and their spun-off subsidiaries, including common resources”
(p.1449). When the spin-off event is completed, this will be considered a “cut-off” point of
resources for the child firm since there are no more (or very little) “parental” resources available.
As a result, this corporate separation will require significant efforts for the child in order to take
strong steps in its business operations so that it will become “legitimate” in the industry. In other
words, proactive efforts will help the child better establish its legitimacy after becoming an
independent, stand-alone entity following the spin-off event.
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Organizational legitimacy as a mediator
Deephouse and Carter (2005) define the legitimacy as “the social acceptance resulting
from adherence to regulative, normative, or cognitive norms and expectations” (p.332). Parallel
to their definition, Arnold, Handelman, and Tigert (1996) define the institutional environment as
an environment that “contains the norms, rules, and requirements to which individual
organizations must conform” (p.231). Both of these definitions show that firms are obligated to
adapt to conditions of the institutional environment that they are a part of and thus they will be
accepted as an “official” member of that environment, which refers to becoming legitimate.

As Certo and Hodge (2007) argue, the organizational legitimacy depends on whether the
individual firm is able to understand, accept, and follow general guidelines that are considered
appropriate in the institutional environment. This particular condition will especially become
very critical in the context of corporate spin-offs since the child firm becomes a stand-alone
entity and has no (or very little) connection with its parent after their separation. In other words,
after becoming independent, the child will have the responsibility for thoroughly scanning the
environment on its own and understanding norms and expectations of that environment so that it
can obtain resources necessary for growth without getting any help from its parent. As Suddaby
and Greenwood (2005) also argue, the legitimacy is “a crucial element in the creation and
survival of new organizational forms” (p.37). Their argument provides further evidence for the
legitimacy being an important survival factor for the child firm since these firms are newly
independent organizational forms.
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As Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) state, one of the most important reasons for the
spin-off event is the lack of fit between the divesting firm and its subsidiary in terms of business
operations. When that is the case, some parent firms prefer spinning of their child in order to
create more efficient conditions for themselves and their child (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam,
1999) as well as renew their organizational identity via applying changes in their corporate focus
(Corley and Gioia, 2004). For the child firm, following the separation, it will be very important
to carefully analyze the environment so that it better understands what it needs to do in order to
become a “legitimate player” in its environment. According to the institutional theory,
organizations can better gain legitimacy via adapting to norms and expectations of the external
environment (Gupta, Dirsmith, and Fogarty, 1994). As a newly independent entity, the child firm
will have to take these environmental demands and norms into serious consideration and create
its strategies accordingly so that it can survive in the long run.

By being proactive, the child will get to know its industry better and faster including
culture, norms, rules, regulations, and expectations within that particular industry. In addition to
that, by proactively searching, discovering, and acquiring scarce resources that may not be
readily available (Obloj, Obloj, and Pratt, 2010), the child firm will also expedite the process of
running its business operations on its own and more efficiently. After going through all these
proactive steps, the child firm will be able to establish its legitimacy and increase its
performance. Therefore, I argue that the proactive behavior of the child firm will have a positive
effect on its performance and the organizational legitimacy will mediate the relationship.
Proposition 1: The proactiveness is positively related to the performance of the child firm and
this relationship is mediated by the legitimacy.
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CEO hubris as a moderator
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) define the hubris as an “exaggerated pride or selfconfidence, often resulting in retribution” (p.106). By another definition, the hubris is “an
exaggerated belief about one’s own judgment that may deviate from objective standards” (Li and
Tang, 2010: 46). In the literature, the executive hubris is considered a cognitive bias in decisionmaking (Li and Tang, 2010) and expected to yield three main consequences: “overestimation of
individual’s own problem-solving capabilities, underestimation of resource requirements of risky
initiatives as well as uncertainties facing their firms” (Li and Tang, 2010: 45-46). All these
definitions show that the hubris may make executives take faulty steps in their decisions.

According to Malmendier and Tate (2008), the extreme overconfidence that hubristic
executives possess usually results in the overestimation of their abilities in creating value for
their organizations. They further argue that these kinds of misperceptions may cause a significant
decrease in the investment of shareholders in these companies as well as the level of synergies
between business partners (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Additionally, extreme overconfident
behaviors of executives may lead to using too much simplistic procedures to undertake difficult
projects and organizational tasks as well as not being able to see shifting realities within the
environment (Kroll, Toombs, and Wright, 2000). Also, from the perspective of decision making,
hubristic executives tend to primarily rely on mental short-cuts and miss out on critical
information required for detailed analysis (Trevelyan, 2008).
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On the “bright side” of hubris, Galasso and Simcoe (2011) argue that hubristic executives
tend to lean toward an increased propensity in innovation efforts of their firms. Executives’
extreme overconfidence can also have an important impact on both changing the firm’s strategic
directions and spending more resources for R&D activities, which may lead to an increase in the
productivity of their firm (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011). Parallel to this argument, Simon and
Houghton (2013) state that those executives who possess extreme overconfidence are better able
to pursue product introductions that are considered pioneering and risky. Since they have the
tendency of believing in themselves so much for executing difficult tasks rather than simple ones
as well as better dealing with uncertainties, hubristic executives are more dedicated to firm
innovation and newness (Tang, Li, and Yang, 2012). This kind of a mindset for executives
should be considered unique since it makes the firm competitive among its rivals.

In the context of spin-offs, after the corporate separation from its parent, the child firm
will first need to establish its legitimacy within its industry as the initial step for becoming strong
stand-alone entities. In order to accomplish that, top executives of the child firm, particularly
CEOs, will need to critically analyze all dimensions of the environment by avoiding any “shortcuts” on their decisions. In other words, for the child firm, until the legitimacy is established, all
corporate efforts will need to be done on a “step-by-step” basis by not simplifying situations that
may affect organizational tasks and procedures. This will require a careful attention on all tasks
regardless of the level of their difficulty. Therefore, having a hubristic CEO may not work quite
well until the child firm establishes its legitimacy due to their misperceptions or misevaluations
caused by their extreme overconfidence.
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After the establishment of legitimacy, however, top executives’ (such as CEOs)
inclinations towards more risky actions may become an advantage for the child firm in order to
become more competitive in the industry. These hubristic CEOs may prefer spending more
resources on R&D towards innovation and taking the risk of creating new product and services
to become an industry leader. For the child firm, it may be quite important to take further steps
for becoming “completely” independent from its parent by making significant changes in its
operations instead of being stuck with same practices before the spin-off event. Therefore,
hubristic CEOs may be quite helpful to carry the child firm to a higher stage in the industry via
trying something new and risk-involved innovative activities.

As stated in the literature on hubris, this is a construct that has both positive and negative
sides in terms of its effects on firm performance (Hayward, Shepherd, and Griffin, 2006;
Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Kroll et al., 2000; Li and Tang, 2010; Seth, Song, and Pettit,
2000). In the context of spin-offs, I argue that until the child firm establishes its legitimacy,
having a hubristic CEO may not be quite desirable; however, after this legitimacy is established,
having a hubristic CEO may be actually beneficial.
Proposition 2a: Having a hubristic CEO will negatively moderate the relationship between child
firm proactiveness and organizational legitimacy.
Proposition 2b: Having a hubristic CEO will positively moderate the relationship between
organizational legitimacy and child firm performance.
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DISCUSSION
Corporate spin-offs are unique restructuring activities that particularly help businesses
focus on their core activities (Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997), provide investors with a
transparency on business operations (Bergh et al., 2008) as well as mitigate the information
asymmetry on its operations (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999), and create a better
shareholder value (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983). After this corporate separation, the spun-off
subsidiary (the child firm) becomes an independent, stand-alone publicly traded entity, which
means that most resources available via its parent will no longer exist.

By embracing a proactive posture, the child firm will be able to look for new
opportunities via a careful scanning of the environment and acquire resources necessary for its
long-term survival. In other words, being proactive will provide the child firm with a strategic
advantage in regard to taking innovative steps and rejecting the status quo coming from the
parent firm (Crant, 2000). All these unique efforts towards being new will first help this child
better and faster establish its legitimacy within the sector, which refers to being able to meet
requirements of the institutional environment (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). As a result,
becoming “legitimate” will help the child firm achieve positive performance outcomes.

During all these challenging organizational processes, managerial factors will also need
to be critically considered. After the spin-off event, top executives in the child firm will have to
take into account each single detail and not miss on any critical information that may make a
negative influence on their firms’ efforts of establishing legitimacy. This means that a hubristic
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CEO may not be the best option at the first place for the child firm. However, after the firm’s
legitimacy is established, it may be quite beneficial to have a hubristic CEO who is willing to
take risks for further improve business operations and put more emphasis on innovative activities
that the child firm is not familiar with. Therefore, the CEO hubris plays a bilateral role in the
context of spin-offs.

CONCLUSION
This research focuses on success parameters of the child firm after the spin-off event. In
particular, I argue that being proactive will help the child establish its legitimacy and in turn
increase its performance. I define this process as a fully-mediated model. In addition, I argue that
top decision makers’ behavioral characteristics will make a significant impact on this process.
More specifically, I argue that having a hubristic CEO will be harmful for the child firm before
the legitimacy is established; however, in later stages a hubristic CEO will actually become
beneficial for the child firm. Therefore this conceptual research shows effects of proactiveness,
legitimacy, and hubris on the performance of the child firm.

This research has some limitations. First, it only looks at proactiveness as a firm-level
behavior. Second, it does consider any environmental dimensions that may have a contingency
effect on this model. Third, it only looks at the CEO as the top decision maker without
considering the board structure. However, these limitations can certainly be addressed in future
research. First of all, it may be helpful to identify some other firm-level behaviors while
explaining the performance of the child firm. Secondly, environmental dimensions such as
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dynamism and munificence may be included as contingency factors in the model. And finally, it
may be fruitful to look at how the interaction between the board and CEO can help to better
explain the phenomenon.

In conclusion, the child firm’s performance after becoming an independent, stand-alone
entity may depend on several factors. It is very important to further examine the behavior of the
firm and executives as well as industry conditions in order to come up with a better
understanding for why some child firms perform better than others after their corporate
separation. Expanding the conceptual framework proposed in this study and empirically
analyzing it in later stages will be very helpful for examining the performance of spun-off
subsidiaries.
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Figure 1 The post-spin-off performance of the child firm
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